Yesterday,
the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in Wolfold v. Lopez. The
issue in the case is whether Hawaii's law, which prohibits concealed
carry on private property open to the public by default, requiring owners to
give express permission (often via signs) for guns to be
allowed. The Plaintiff in the case (Jason Wolford) and pro-rights
advocates say this effectively bans guns in most places, turning public spaces
into "no-carry zones" and infringing on rights established in New
York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen. Hawaii's AG, Anne
E. Lopez, argues the Second Amendment doesn't grant a right to carry on others'
property without consent and that the law upholds property owners'
rights.
VSSA Life
Member Stephe Halbrook has a piece over
at The Volokh Conspiracy explaining what came up several time in the arguments.
One issue that
was alluded to several times in the argument is the scope of the so-called
"sensitive places" limitation on the Second Amendment's
protections. Wolford is not really a "sensitive
places" case—it is actually about the handful of places Hawaii did
not separately declare "sensitive," since the
no-carry-default rule applies only to places that the state has not made
no-carry-no-matter-what. Nevertheless, it is quite probable that in dealing
with the issue the Court will touch on, and possibly explain, its previous
statements on the issue.
The Court's
"sensitive places" dicta have been the source of some significant
confusion for courts and litigants alike. In District of Columbia v.
Heller, as it struck down D.C.'s handgun ban, the Court cautioned that
"nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on … the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools
and government buildings." Later, in NYSRPA v. Bruen,
the Court explained its statement in part as a way of demonstrating its
historical method, writing that "although the historical record yields
relatively few 18th- and 19th-century 'sensitive places' where weapons were
altogether prohibited—e.g., legislative assemblies, polling places, and
courthouses—we are also aware of no disputes regarding the lawfulness of such
prohibitions." But Bruen cautioned, "there is no
historical basis for New York to effectively declare the island of Manhattan a
'sensitive place' simply because it is crowded and protected generally by the
New York City Police Department."
This list of
locations (which Bruen got from the article by
David B. Kopel and Joseph Greenlee, The "Sensitive Places"
Doctrine, Charleston L. Rev. 2018) -- legislatures, polling places, and
courts -- has led to significant disagreement among judges and litigants, even
litigants on the same side of the issue. What restrictions do those three
places have in common?
In his article Dangerous,
but Not Unusual, Georgetown JL&PP 2024, Mark W. Smith surveyed the
variety of historical "principles" that were being advanced to unite
these historical laws and to analogize to modern statutes. He catalogued and
criticized arguments that defined "sensitive places" as (1) places
where "core government functions" are carried out, (2) places that
meet a "collateral damage test" because misuse of a firearm would
seem to be particularly problematic there, (3) places where "vulnerable
people" congregate (more an issue for the schools that Heller mentioned
than the legislative assemblies mentioned in Bruen), and (4) places
where people exercise other constitutional rights. Professor Smith rejected
each of these principles with good reasons -- who is not "vulnerable"
to the misuse of a firearm? and why should we make those targets softer?
Instead, he suggests a fifth principle that fits the evidence better: the
presence of comprehensive government security in those locations.
The case could
set a precedent for similar laws in other states (like California, Maryland,
New Jersey, and New York) and determine if states can default to a
"no-carry" rule on private property, or if they must justify such
bans historically, notes SCOTUSblog.
Initial reports from the hearing indicated that the conservative majority appeared skeptical of Hawaii's law, questioning whether it imposes an undue burden on the right to public carry established in earlier precedents. A final decision is expected by the summer of 2026.